Do Markets Favor Women's Human Capital More than Planners?

35 Pages Posted: 15 Nov 2004

See all articles by Daniel Munich

Daniel Munich

CERGE-EI, joint workplace of the Charles University and Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic

Jan Svejnar

School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, NY, USA; CEPR; IZA; CERGE-EI; University of Ljubljana

Katherine Terrell

Stephen M. Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2004

Abstract

Using micro data on women in the Czech Republic, we compare returns to various measures of human capital at the end of communism (1989), in mid-transition (1996) and in late/post-transition (2002). We show: dramatic increases in returns to education from 1989 to 1996 but no change from 1996 to 2002; no differences in returns to education by state vs. privately-owned firms; "sheepskin" effects in both regimes, which rise over time and are similar across firm ownership; no difference in returns to education obtained during communism vs. transition; no change in wage-experience profiles over time; and similar increases in returns to education for women and men. In sum, markets pay women and men equally more for their human capital than the planners did; all the adjustment occurred in early transition and was driven by market forces rather than private ownership.

Keywords: human capital, wages, transition, sheepskin effects, Czech Republic

JEL Classification: J24, J31, P20, P31

Suggested Citation

Munich, Daniel and Svejnar, Jan and Terrell, Katherine, Do Markets Favor Women's Human Capital More than Planners? (November 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=620341 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.620341

Daniel Munich

CERGE-EI, joint workplace of the Charles University and Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic ( email )

Politickych veznu 7
Prague 1, 11121
Czech Republic
+420 224005175 (Phone)
+420 224 227 143 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cerge-ei.cz

Jan Svejnar

School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, NY, USA ( email )

420 West 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States

CEPR

London
United Kingdom

IZA

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

CERGE-EI

P.O. Box 882
7 Politickych veznu
111 21 Prague 1, Prague
Czech Republic

HOME PAGE: http://www.cerge-ei.cz

University of Ljubljana ( email )

Dunajska 104
Ljubljana, 1000
Slovenia

Katherine Terrell (Contact Author)

Stephen M. Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy ( email )

735 South State Street, Weill Hall
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States

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