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Choice and Performance of Governance Mechanisms: Matching Contractual and Relational Governance to Sources of Asset Specificity


Glenn P. Hoetker


University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Business Administration

Thomas Mellewigt


Free University of Berlin (FUB)
November 17, 2004


Abstract:     
We examine the relationship between the nature of assets involved in an alliance and the optimal configuration of contractual and relational governance mechanisms. Examination of governance choice and performance in the German telecommunications industry indicates that physical assets are more suited to contractual controls, while knowledge assets are best governed via relational mechanisms. Relational governance actually harms alliance performance in the presence of physical assets. Implications for the study and management of alliances are discussed.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

JEL Classification: L22, M10, L96

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Date posted: November 22, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Hoetker, Glenn P. and Mellewigt, Thomas, Choice and Performance of Governance Mechanisms: Matching Contractual and Relational Governance to Sources of Asset Specificity (November 17, 2004). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=621742 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.621742

Contact Information

Glenn Patrick Hoetker (Contact Author)
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Business Administration ( email )
1206 South Sixth Street
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
217-265-4081 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.business.uiuc.edu/ghoetker
Thomas Mellewigt
Free University of Berlin (FUB) ( email )
D-10785 Berlin, Berlin 14195
Germany
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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