The Unsolvable Dilemma of a Paretian Policymaker
University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics (ACLE); Tinbergen Institute
Nuno M. Garoupa
Texas A&M University School of Law; Católica Global Law School
Supreme Court Economic Review, Forthcoming
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 04-52
In this paper, we argue that social decisionmaking is subject to a fundamental conflict between consistency and completeness. We show that a consistent welfarist method of policy assessment, that is, one that never violates the Pareto principle, may be incomplete in the sense of being incapable of providing a solution to important social welfare problems.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 12
Keywords: Individualistic social welfare, Interdependent preferences
JEL Classification: C0, D63, K0
Date posted: November 18, 2004
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