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Strategic Responses to the Reputation Commons Problem
Andrew A. King Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business Michael Lenox University of Virginia - Darden School of Business Michael L. Barnett University of Oxford / Said Business School ORGANIZATIONS, POLICY, AND THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT: INSTITUTIONAL AND STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES, A. Hoffman and M. Ventresca, eds., pp. 393-406, Stanford University Press, 2002 Abstract: Firms within an industry often find themselves tarred by the same brush. When accidents occur, stakeholders often punish both the offending firm and the entire industry. In this way, a firm's reputation may be tied to other firms, and so reputation may be a common resource shared by all members of an industry - what we term a reputation commons. As with many shared resources, an industry's reputation may be overexploited. A firm can benefit from the favorable reputation of an industry even as it takes individual actions that may harm this shared reputation. In this chapter, we explore when a reputation commons is likely to occur and discuss how firms individually and collectively respond to the problems associated with it. We propose that firms can solve the reputation commons problem by reducing the sanctioning ability of stakeholders and by privatizing reputation.
Keywords: Tragedy of the commons, reputation, collective action Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: November 30, 2004 ; Last revised: November 30, 2004Suggested CitationContact Information
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