Rethinking International Insolvency: The Neglected Role of Choice-of-Law Rules and Theory
Hannah L. Buxbaum
Indiana University Bloomington Maurer School of Law
Stanford Journal of International Law, Vol. 36, No. 23, 2000
Solutions to the problem of international bankruptcy are generally framed as either universalist (arguing that international bankruptcies should be administered in a single forum) or territorialist (arguing in favor of multiple local bankruptcies). This article seeks to expand this debate by using traditional conflicts theory to examine the problem of cross-border bankruptcy. It analyzes the current regime under which cross-border bankruptcies are administered in U.S. courts, concluding that this regime operates as a multilateralist (jurisdiction-selecting) regime. Concluding that multilateralism is an appropriate method for resolving choice-of-law issues in international insolvency, the article analyzes some possible refinements to the current system. It argues that a more pointedly multilateralist approach would better serve the goals of the international bankruptcy regime.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 50
Keywords: International bankruptcy, international insolvency, choice-of-law, comityAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: December 3, 2004
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