Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=643389
 
 

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Should Business Groups be Dismantled? The Equilibrium Costs of Efficient Internal Capital Markets


Heitor Almeida


University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Daniel Wolfenzon


Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

July 7, 2004

AFA 2005 Philadelphia Meetings

Abstract:     
We analyze the relationship between conglomerates' internal capital markets and the efficiency of economy-wide capital allocation, and identify a novel cost of conglomeration that arises from an equilibrium framework. Because of financial market imperfections engendered by imperfect investor protection, conglomerates that engage in "winner-picking" (Stein, 1997) find it optimal to allocate scarce capital internally to mediocre projects, even when other firms in the economy have higher productivity projects that are in need of additional capital. This bias for internal capital allocation can decrease allocative efficiency even when conglomerates have efficient internal capital markets, because a substantial presence of conglomerates might make it harder for other firms in the economy to raise capital. We also argue that the negative externality associated with conglomeration is particularly costly for countries that are at intermediary levels of financial development. In such countries, a high degree of conglomeration, generated for example by the control of the corporate sector by family business groups, may decrease the efficiency of the capital market. Our theory generates novel empirical predictions that cannot be derived in models that ignore the equilibrium effects of conglomerates. These predictions are consistent with anecdotal evidence that the presence of business groups in developing countries inhibits the growth of new independent firms due to lack of finance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Keywords: capital allocation, conglomerates, investor protection, internal capital markets

JEL Classification: G15, G31, D92

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Date posted: January 5, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Almeida, Heitor and Wolfenzon, Daniel, Should Business Groups be Dismantled? The Equilibrium Costs of Efficient Internal Capital Markets (July 7, 2004). AFA 2005 Philadelphia Meetings. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=643389 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.643389

Contact Information

Heitor Almeida (Contact Author)
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ( email )
515 East Gregory Drive
4037 BIF
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
217-3332704 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.business.illinois.edu/FacultyProfile/faculty_profile.aspx?ID=11357
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Daniel Wolfenzon
Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics ( email )
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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