SSRN Home Search and Download Papers Browse Abstract and Paper Submission Subscribe to Networks View Briefcase Top Papers Top Authors Top Institutions

 

Abstract

 
 

Citations (3)

Beta

 
 

Footnotes (120)

Beta

 


 


Download | Share | Email | Add to Briefcase | Buy Hard Copy

The Political Economy of Public Use in Poletown: How Federal Grants Encourage Excessive Use of Eminent Domain

William A. Fischel
Dartmouth College - Department of Economics


February 2005


Abstract:     
This article argues that the use of eminent domain that was at issue in Poletown [304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981)] was flawed by fiscal constraints. The funding for the project, which leveled a thickly-settled neighborhood of Detroit in order to build an automobile plant, was provided almost entirely by the federal government. I argue that it is unlikely that the city of Detroit would have undertaken the project if it was required to raise its own funds to finance it or if the money had been given to the city by the federal government to do with as it pleased. The Michigan Supreme Court's intentions in Hathcock [684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004)] to forestall the use of eminent domain for Poletown-like economic development would be better served by an inquiry into the nature of the financing of the projects than a categorical ban on them.

Keywords: Eminent domain, public use, takings clause, local taxes, intergovernmental grants

JEL Classifications: K11, H7

Working Paper Series

Date posted: January 10, 2005 ; Last revised: February 07, 2005

Suggested Citation

Fischel, William A., The Political Economy of Public Use in Poletown: How Federal Grants Encourage Excessive Use of Eminent Domain (February 2005). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=645402 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.645402


Export to: Export Citation What's this?

Contact Information

William A. Fischel (Contact Author)
Dartmouth College - Department of Economics ( email )
Hanover, NH 03755
United States
603-646-2940 (Phone)
603-646-2122 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.dartmouth.edu/~wfischel/
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,880
Downloads: 173
Download Rank: 49,192
Citations: 3
Footnotes: 120

© 2009 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Use  Privacy Policy
This page was served by apollo2 in 0.125 seconds.