Abstract

 
 

References (43)



 


 



Post-Thatcher Fiscal Strategies in the U.K.: An Interpretation


Andrew J. Hughes


Cardiff Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics

December 2004

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1372

Abstract:     
Fiscal policy in Britain has changed radically since the Keynesianism of the 1960s and 1970s. After a passive period under monetarism of the 1980s, fiscal policy is said to have adopted a leadership role with long term objectives (low debt, the provision of public services/investment, and social equity), together with an independent central bank. Monetary policy, operating with instrument independence, then takes care of short run stabilisation. I test this view - confronting it with evidence from the institutional arrangements put in place since 1997; with econometric evidence from the policy responses themselves; and with theoretical evidence on the incentive to choose such a regime in the first place. I conclude that this claim is broadly correct. It appears that the UK's improved performance is a consequence of the advantages of combining fiscal leadership with an (instrument) independent central bank. The key feature is the ability to trade target (not instrument) independence in monetary policy to secure greater coordination between fiscal and monetary strategies.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: Stackelberg leadership, policy complementarity, institutional coordination

JEL Classification: E52, E61, F42

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: January 10, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Hughes, Andrew J., Post-Thatcher Fiscal Strategies in the U.K.: An Interpretation (December 2004). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1372. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=646063

Contact Information

Andrew J. Hughes Hallett (Contact Author)
Cardiff Business School ( email )
Aberconway Building
Cardiff CF10 3EU
United Kingdom
+44 292 087 001 (Phone)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics ( email )
Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States
615-322-8539 (Phone)
615-343-8495 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 786
Downloads: 95
Download Rank: 139,952
References:  43

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.406 seconds