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http://ssrn.com/abstract=647841
 
 

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More Banks, Less Crime? The Real and Social Effects of Bank Competition


Mark J. Garmaise


University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management

Tobias J. Moskowitz


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business


AFA 2005 Philadelphia Meetings Paper

Abstract:     
We examine the link between the competitiveness of the local banking market, urban development, and crime. We provide micro-level evidence that neighborhoods that experienced more bank mergers are subjected to future reduced loan provision, diminished local construction, lower prices and rents, an influx of poorer households, and higher crime in subsequent years. A one standard deviation increase in bank concentration raises homicide and burglary rates by approximately 1 percent. We show that these results are not likely due to reverse causation, and confirm the central findings using state branching deregulation to instrument for bank competition.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

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Date posted: January 13, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Garmaise, Mark J. and Moskowitz, Tobias J., More Banks, Less Crime? The Real and Social Effects of Bank Competition. AFA 2005 Philadelphia Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=647841 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.647841

Contact Information

Mark J. Garmaise (Contact Author)
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management ( email )
110 Westwood Plaza
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States
Tobias J. Moskowitz
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-834-2757 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)
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