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Capital and Risk: New Evidence on Implications of Large Operational Losses
Patrick De Fontnouvelle Federal Reserve Bank of Boston - Supervision and Regulation Virginia De Jesus-Rueff affiliation not provided to SSRN John S. Jordan FitchRisk Eric S. Rosengren Federal Reserve Bank of Boston - Supervision and Regulation September 2003 FRB of Boston Working Paper No. 03-5 Abstract: Operational risk is currently receiving significant media attention, as financial scandals have appeared regularly and multiple events have exceeded one billion dollars in total impact. Regulators have also been devoting attention to this risk, and are finalizing proposals that would require banks to hold capital for potential operational losses. This paper uses newly available loss data to model operational risk at internationally active banks. Our results suggest that the amount of capital held for operational risk will often exceed capital held for market risk, and that the largest banks could choose to allocate several billion dollars in capital to operational risk. In addition to capital allocation decisions, our findings should have a direct impact on the compensation and investment models used by large firms, as well as on the optimal allocation of risk management resources.
Keywords: Basel Accord, economic capital, operational risk JEL Classifications: C24, G21, G28 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: January 13, 2005 ; Last revised: February 10, 2005Suggested CitationContact Information
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