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Optimal Redistributive Taxation in a Search Equilibrium Model


Mathias Hungerbühler


Catholic University of Louvain; Université Paris II - Panthéon-Assas - ERMES

Etienne Lehmann


CREST; Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - School of Economic and Social Research (IRES); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Alexis Parmentier


University of Paris 2 Pantheon-Assas - ERMES; University of Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne - Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative (EUREQUA)

Bruno Van der Linden


Université Catholique de Louvain - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); Université Paris II - Panthéon-Assas - ERMES

January 2005

IZA Discussion Paper No. 1460

Abstract:     
This paper characterizes optimal non-linear income taxation in an economy with a continuum of unobservable productivity levels and endogenous involuntary unemployment due to frictions in the labor markets. Redistributive taxation distorts labor demand and wages. Compared to their efficient values, gross wages, unemployment and participation are lower. Average tax rates are increasing. Marginal tax rates are positive, even at the top. Finally, numerical simulations suggest that redistribution is much more important in our setting than in a comparable Mirrlees (1971) setting.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: optimal income taxation, unemployment, wage bargaining, matching

JEL Classification: D82, H21, H24, J64

working papers series


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Date posted: January 19, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Hungerbühler, Mathias, Lehmann, Etienne, Parmentier, Alexis and Van der Linden, Bruno, Optimal Redistributive Taxation in a Search Equilibrium Model (January 2005). IZA Discussion Paper No. 1460. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=650173

Contact Information

Mathias Hungerbühler
Catholic University of Louvain ( email )
Place Montesquieu, 3
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, 1348
Belgium
Université Paris II - Panthéon-Assas - ERMES
12 Place du Panthéon
Paris, Cedex 5, 75005
France
Etienne Lehmann (Contact Author)
CREST ( email )
France
Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - School of Economic and Social Research (IRES) ( email )
3, Place Montesquieu
1348 Louvain-la-Neuve
Belgium
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Alexis Parmentier
University of Paris 2 Pantheon-Assas - ERMES ( email )
12 Place du Panthéon
Paris, Cedex 5, 75005
France
University of Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne - Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative (EUREQUA)
106-112 Boulevard de l'Hopital
Paris Cedex 13, 75647
France
Bruno Van der Linden
Université Catholique de Louvain - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales ( email )
3, Place Montesquieu
Louvain-la-Neuve, 1348
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://perso.uclouvain.be/bruno.vanderlinden/
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Université Paris II - Panthéon-Assas - ERMES
12 Place du Panthéon
Paris, Cedex 5, 75005
France
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