Abstract

 
 

References (29)



 
 

Citations (314)



 


 



Private Credit in 129 Countries


Simeon Djankov


Ministry of Finance; World Bank

Caralee McLiesh


World Bank - International Finance Corporation (IFC)

Andrei Shleifer


Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

January 2005

NBER Working Paper No. w11078

Abstract:     
We investigate cross-country determinants of private credit, using new data on legal creditor rights and private and public credit registries in 129 countries. We find that both creditor protection through the legal system and information sharing institutions are associated with higher ratios of private credit to GDP, but that the former is relatively more important in the richer countries. An analysis of legal reforms also shows that improvements in creditor rights and in information sharing precede faster credit growth. We also find that creditor rights are extremely stable over time, contrary to the convergence hypothesis. Finally, we find that legal origins are an important determinant of both creditor rights and information sharing institutions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: June 16, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Djankov, Simeon, McLiesh, Caralee and Shleifer, Andrei, Private Credit in 129 Countries (January 2005). NBER Working Paper No. w11078. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=652366

Contact Information

Simeon Djankov
Ministry of Finance ( email )
Rakovski Avenue 102
Sofia, 1040
Bulgaria
World Bank ( email )
2121 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-473-4748 (Phone)
202-473-5758 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.doingbusiness.org
Caralee McLiesh
World Bank - International Finance Corporation (IFC) ( email )
2121 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States
Andrei Shleifer (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-5046 (Phone)
617-496-1708 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~ashleife/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,364
Downloads: 70
Download Rank: 19,320
References:  29
Citations:  314

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.687 seconds