|
|
|
|
||||
|
||||
Properties of Scoring AuctionsJohn AskerNew York University - Leonard N. School of Business - Department of Economics Estelle CantillonFree University of Brussels (VUB/ULB) - ECARES; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) November 2004 CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4734 Abstract: This Paper studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to buy differentiated products: suppliers submit offers on all dimensions of the good (price, level of non monetary attributes), and these are evaluated using a scoring rule. We provide a systematic analysis of equilibrium behavior in scoring auctions when suppliers' private information is multidimensional (characterization of equilibrium behavior and expected utility equivalence) and show that scoring auctions dominate several other commonly used procedures for buying differentiated products.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 28 Keywords: Procurement, multi-attribute, multidimensional private information, auction JEL Classification: D44, L14, L24 working papers seriesDate posted: January 28, 2005Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was processed by apollo2 in 3.204 seconds
Add to Cart
