Properties of Scoring Auctions
New York University - Leonard N. School of Business - Department of Economics
Free University of Brussels (VUB/ULB) - ECARES; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4734
This Paper studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to buy differentiated products: suppliers submit offers on all dimensions of the good (price, level of non monetary attributes), and these are evaluated using a scoring rule. We provide a systematic analysis of equilibrium behavior in scoring auctions when suppliers' private information is multidimensional (characterization of equilibrium behavior and expected utility equivalence) and show that scoring auctions dominate several other commonly used procedures for buying differentiated products.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 28
Keywords: Procurement, multi-attribute, multidimensional private information, auction
JEL Classification: D44, L14, L24working papers series
Date posted: January 28, 2005
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