Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=668131
 
 

References (44)



 
 

Citations (43)



 


 



Accountability and Corruption: Political Institutions Matter


Daniel Lederman


The World Bank - International Trade Department

Norman Loayza


World Bank - Research Department

Rodrigo R. Soares


University of Maryland - Department of Economics; Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio) - Department of Economics; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)


Economics & Politics, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 1-35, March 2005

Abstract:     
This study uses a cross-country panel to examine the determinants of corruption, paying particular attention to political institutions that increase accountability. Even though the theoretical literature has stressed the importance of political institutions in determining corruption, the empirical literature is relatively scarce. Our results confirm the role of political institutions in determining the prevalence of corruption. Democracies, parliamentary systems, political stability, and freedom of press are all associated with lower corruption. Additionally, common results of the previous empirical literature, related to openness and legal tradition, do not hold once political variables are taken into account.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: February 16, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Lederman, Daniel and Loayza, Norman and Soares, Rodrigo R., Accountability and Corruption: Political Institutions Matter. Economics & Politics, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 1-35, March 2005. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=668131

Contact Information

Daniel Lederman
The World Bank - International Trade Department ( email )
1818 H Street NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States
HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/danielledermanworldbank/
Norman Loayza
World Bank - Research Department ( email )
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States
Rodrigo R. Soares (Contact Author)
University of Maryland - Department of Economics ( email )
3105 Tydings Hall
College Park, MD 20742
United States
301-405-3501 (Phone)
301-405-3542 (Fax)
Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio) - Department of Economics ( email )
Rua Marques de Sao Vicente, 225/206F
Rio de Janeiro, RJ 22453
Brazil
(55-21) 3114-1078 (Phone)
(55-21) 3114-1084 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.puc-rio.br/soares/
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Feedback to SSRN


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References:  44
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