Accountability and Corruption: Political Institutions Matter
The World Bank - International Trade Department
World Bank - Research Department
Rodrigo R. Soares
University of Maryland - Department of Economics; Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio) - Department of Economics; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Economics & Politics, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 1-35, March 2005
This study uses a cross-country panel to examine the determinants of corruption, paying particular attention to political institutions that increase accountability. Even though the theoretical literature has stressed the importance of political institutions in determining corruption, the empirical literature is relatively scarce. Our results confirm the role of political institutions in determining the prevalence of corruption. Democracies, parliamentary systems, political stability, and freedom of press are all associated with lower corruption. Additionally, common results of the previous empirical literature, related to openness and legal tradition, do not hold once political variables are taken into account.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 35
Date posted: February 16, 2005
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