When Redistribution Leads to Regressive Taxation
Toulouse Business School
Universite du Luxembourg
CORE Discussion Paper No. 2004/20
University Ca' Foscari of Venice, Dept. of Economics Research Paper Series No. 30/06
We introduce labour contracts in a framework of optimal redistribution: firms have some local market power and try to discriminate among heterogeneous workers. In this setting we show that if the firms have perfect information, i.e, they perfectly discriminate against workers and take all the surplus, the best tax function is flat. If firms have imperfect information, i.e, if they offer incentive contracts, then (under some assumptions) the best redistributive taxation is regressive.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 22
Keywords: Income Taxation, Redistribution, Labor market, Multi-principals, Adverse selection, Mechanism design
JEL Classification: D21, D82, H21, L14working papers series
Date posted: February 20, 2005
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