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Which Investors Fear Expropriation? Evidence from Investors' Portfolio Choices


Mariassunta Giannetti


Stockholm School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Andrei Simonov


Michigan State University - Eli Broad Graduate School of Management; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy; SITE


Journal of Finance, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
Using a data set that provides unprecedented detail on investors' stockholdings, we analyze whether investors take the quality of corporate governance into account when selecting stocks. We find that all categories of investors (domestic and foreign, institutional and small individual investors), who generally enjoy only security benefits, are reluctant to invest in companies with weak corporate governance. In contrast, individuals who are connected with company insiders are more likely to invest in weak corporate governance companies. These findings suggest that it is important to distinguish between investors who enjoy private benefits or access private information, and investors who enjoy only security benefits.

Keywords: Investor behavior, shareholder base, security benefits, private benefits, portfolio selection, corporate governance

JEL Classification: G11, G32, F21

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: February 21, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Giannetti, Mariassunta and Simonov, Andrei, Which Investors Fear Expropriation? Evidence from Investors' Portfolio Choices. Journal of Finance, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=669501

Contact Information

Mariassunta Giannetti (Contact Author)
Stockholm School of Economics ( email )
P.O. Box 6501
Sveavagen 65
SE-113 83 Stockholm
Sweden
+46 8 736 9607 (Phone)
+46 8 312 327 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www2.hhs.se/personal/giannetti
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Andrei Simonov
Michigan State University - Eli Broad Graduate School of Management ( email )
315 Eppley Center
East Lansing, MI 48824-1122
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.andreisimonov.com
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy ( email )
Moscow
Russia
SITE ( email )
P.O. Box 6501
S-113 83 Stockholm
Sweden
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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