A Search-Based Theory of the On-the-Run Phenomenon
University of California, Los Angeles; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
London School of Economics; Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
October 30, 2006
AFA 2006 Boston Meetings Paper
We propose a model in which assets with identical cash flows can trade at different prices. Infinitely-lived agents can establish long positions in a search spot market, or short positions by first borrowing an asset in a search repo market. We show that short-sellers can endogenously concentrate in one asset because of search externalities and the constraint that they must deliver the asset they borrowed. That asset enjoys greater liquidity, measured by search times, and a higher lending fee ("specialness"). Liquidity and specialness translate into price premia that are consistent with no-arbitrage. We derive closed-form solutions for small frictions, and can generate price differentials in line with observed on-the-run premia.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 71
Keywords: On-the-run bonds, liquidity, specialness, search, arbitrage
JEL Classification: G1, D8
Date posted: March 11, 2005
© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.390 seconds