Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary Comparative Evidence

Beny, Laura

doi:10.2139/ssrn.670233

Abstract

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Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary Comparative Evidence

Laura Nyantung Beny

University of Michigan Law School

January 2005

William Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 741

Abstract:
Despite the longstanding insider trading debate, there is little empirical research on insider trading laws, especially in a comparative context. The article attempts to fill that gap. I find that countries with more prohibitive insider trading laws have more diffuse equity ownership, more accurate stock prices, and more liquid stock markets. These findings are generally robust to controlling for measures of disclosure and enforceability and suggest that formal insider trading laws (especially their deterrent components) matter to stock market development. The article suggests further avenues of empirical research on the specific mechanisms through which insider trading laws might matter and the political economy of their adoption.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

Keywords: Insider trading law, Market efficiency, Ownership structure, Law and finance, Comparative capital markets

JEL Classification: K22, G14, G15, G18, G32

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Date posted: February 22, 2005

Suggested Citation

Beny, Laura Nyantung, Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary Comparative Evidence (January 2005). William Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 741. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=670233 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.670233

Contact Information

Laura Nyantung Beny (Contact Author)

University of Michigan Law School ( email )

625 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215
United States