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Canonical Construction and Statutory Revisionism: The Strange Case of the Appropriations Canon


Mathew D. McCubbins


University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business, Gould School of Law and the Department of Political Science

Daniel B. Rodriguez


Northwestern University - School of Law


Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, 2005

Abstract:     
In this article, we consider the impact of positive political theory on legislative interpretation and, in particular, the debate over interpretive canons. Our vehicle for this consideration is the appropriations canon. By virtue of this canon, courts construe narrowly legislative changes to statutes made through the appropriations process. We consider the underlying logic and rationale of this canon - essentially, that the appropriations process is unrepresentative and insufficiently deliberative - and use this analysis to investigate, more broadly, the processes of canonical construction in the modern statutory interpretation jurisprudence. Canonical construction, we argue, must be attentive to the equilibrium effects of judicial approaches and, moreover, it must be based upon a normatively compelling theory of lawmaking and the legislative process. The appropriations canon fails both of these tests; and, in its structure, it reveals some of the weaknesses of the contemporary reliance on canons to illuminate statutory meaning.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 60

Keywords: positive politcal theory, legislative interpretation, legislative canons, appropriations process, statutory interpretation

JEL Classification: K00

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Date posted: February 24, 2005  

Suggested Citation

McCubbins, Mathew D. and Rodriguez, Daniel B., Canonical Construction and Statutory Revisionism: The Strange Case of the Appropriations Canon. Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, 2005. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=672623

Contact Information

Mathew D. McCubbins
University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business, Gould School of Law and the Department of Political Science ( email )
FBE 06515, Mail Code 0804
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0804
United States
(213)740-5036 (Phone)
Daniel B. Rodriguez (Contact Author)
Northwestern University - School of Law ( email )
375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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