When the Union Hurts the Workers: A Positive Analysis of Immigration Policy
University of Bologna - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Carlotta Berti Ceroni
University of Bologna - Department of Economics
CESifo Working Paper No. 1421
This paper studies the determinants of immigration policy in an economy with entrepreneurs and workers where a trade union has monopoly power over wages. The presence of the union leads a benevolent government to implement a high level of immigration and induces a welfare loss not only from an aggregate point of view, but even from the point of view of workers. In the politico-economic equilibrium where interest groups lobby for immigration, we show the condition under which workers are no longer hurt by the presence of the union.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 27
JEL Classification: F22, J51, J61working papers series
Date posted: February 26, 2005
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