Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts

44 Pages Posted: 25 Mar 2005 Last revised: 2 Nov 2010

See all articles by Mara Faccio

Mara Faccio

Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr. School of Business, Purdue University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Ronald W. Masulis

University of New South Wales, Sydney; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Financial Research Network (FIRN); National University of Singapore (NUS) - Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER)

John J. McConnell

Purdue University

Date Written: March 1, 2005

Abstract

We analyze the likelihood of government bailouts of a sample of 450 politically-connected (but publicly-traded) firms from 35 countries over the period 1997 through 2002. We find that politically-connected firms are significantly more likely to be bailed out than similar non-connected firms. Additionally, politically-connected firms are disproportionately more likely to be bailed out when the IMF or World Bank provide financial assistance to the firm's home country. Further, among firms that are bailed out, those that are politically-connected exhibit significantly worse financial performance than their non-connected peers at the time of the bailout and over the following two years. This evidence suggests that, at least in some countries, political connections influence the allocation of capital through the mechanism of financial assistance when connected companies confront economic distress. It may also explain prior findings that politically-connected firms borrow more than their non-connected peers.

Keywords: Political connections, cronism, bailouts

JEL Classification: G3, G28, G30, G33

Suggested Citation

Faccio, Mara and Masulis, Ronald W. and McConnell, John J., Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts (March 1, 2005). AFA 2006 Boston Meetings Paper, Journal of Finance, Vol. 61, No. 6, pp. 2597-2635, 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=676905 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.676905

Mara Faccio (Contact Author)

Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr. School of Business, Purdue University ( email )

403 W. State Street
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

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Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Ronald W. Masulis

University of New South Wales, Sydney ( email )

UNSW Business School
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Australia
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612-9385-6347 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
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1000 Brussels
Belgium

Financial Research Network (FIRN)

C/- University of Queensland Business School
St Lucia, 4071 Brisbane
Queensland
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://www.firn.org.au

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER) ( email )

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John J. McConnell

Purdue University ( email )

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765-494-7863 (Fax)

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