Laurence R. Helfer
Duke University School of Law; iCourts: Center of Excellence for International Courts
Virginia Law Review, Vol. 91, p. 1579, 2005
Vanderbilt Public Law Research Paper No. 05-05
Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 05-09
This article analyzes the under-explored phenomenon of unilateral exit from international agreements and intergovernmental organizations. Although clauses authorizing denunciation and withdrawal from treaties are pervasive, international legal scholars and international relations theorists have largely ignored them. This article draws upon new empirical evidence to provide a comprehensive interdisciplinary framework for understanding treaty exit. It examines when and why states abandon their treaty commitments and explains how exit helps to resolve certain theoretical and doctrinal puzzles that have long troubled scholars of international affairs.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 71
Keywords: International Law and Trade, Law Institutions and Development, Law and Economics
JEL Classification: K33, K00, F02, O19
Date posted: March 11, 2005
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