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A Variance Screen for Collusion
Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz LECG, LLC; Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics Christopher T. Taylor U.S. Federal Trade Commission - Bureau of Economics Luke Froeb Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management John Geweke University of Iowa - Henry B. Tippie College of Business - Department of Economics March 2005 Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 05-13; FTC Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 275 Abstract: In this paper, we examine price movements over time around the collapse of a bid-rigging conspiracy. While the mean decreased by sixteen percent, the standard deviation increased by over two hundred percent. We hypothesize that conspiracies in other industries would exhibit similar characteristics and search for "pockets" of low price variation as indicators of collusion in the retail gasoline industry in Louisville. We observe no such areas around Louisville in 1996-2002.
Keywords: Collusion, Price Fixing, Firms, Firm JEL Classifications: L12, L41, D40 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: April 07, 2005 ; Last revised: April 18, 2005Suggested CitationContact Information
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