A Variance Screen for Collusion
Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz
Global Economics Group, LLC; New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics
Christopher T. Taylor
U.S. Federal Trade Commission - Bureau of Economics
Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics
University of Technology Sydney - Economics Discipline Group
Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 05-13; FTC Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 275
In this paper, we examine price movements over time around the collapse of a bid-rigging conspiracy. While the mean decreased by sixteen percent, the standard deviation increased by over two hundred percent. We hypothesize that conspiracies in other industries would exhibit similar characteristics and search for "pockets" of low price variation as indicators of collusion in the retail gasoline industry in Louisville. We observe no such areas around Louisville in 1996-2002.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 27
Keywords: Collusion, Price Fixing, Firms, Firm
JEL Classification: L12, L41, D40working papers series
Date posted: April 7, 2005
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