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Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance on the Budapest Stock Exchange: Do Too Many Cooks Spoil the Goulash?

John S. Earle
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research; Central European University - Department of Economics; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Csaba Kucsera
Hungarian Academy of Sciences - Institute of Sociology; Central European University

Almos Telegdy
Hungarian Academy of Sciences - Institute of Economics (IE-HAS); Central European University



Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 254-264, March 2005

Abstract:     
We examine the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance using panel data for firms listed on the Budapest Stock Exchange, where ownership tends to be highly concentrated and frequently involves multiple blocks. Fixed-effects estimates imply that the size of the largest block increases profitability and efficiency strongly and monotonically, but the effects of total blockholdings are much smaller and statistically insignificant. Controlling for the size of the largest block, point estimates of the marginal effects of additional blocks are negative. The results suggest that the marginal costs of concentration may outweigh the benefits when the increased concentration involves "too many cooks".

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: March 20, 2005 ; Last revised: July 13, 2005

Suggested Citation

Earle, John S., Kucsera, Csaba and Telegdy, Almos, Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance on the Budapest Stock Exchange: Do Too Many Cooks Spoil the Goulash?. Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 254-264, March 2005. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=684312


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Contact Information

John S. Earle (Contact Author)
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research ( email )
300 South Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686
United States
269-385-0435 (Phone)
269-343-3308 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.upjohninstitute.org/staff/earle.html
Central European University - Department of Economics ( email )
Nador u. 9.
Budapest H-1051 Hungary
+36 1 327 3229 (Phone)
+36 1 327 3232 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.ceu.hu/labor/staff.html
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
D-53072 Bonn Germany
Csaba Kucsera
Hungarian Academy of Sciences - Institute of Sociology ( email )
Uri utca 49
H-1014 Budapest Hungary
Central European University
Nador utca 9
H-1051 Budapest Hungary
Almos Telegdy
Hungarian Academy of Sciences - Institute of Economics (IE-HAS) ( email )
Budaorsi u 45
Budapest H-1112 1112
Hungary
Central European University ( email )
Nador utca 9
H-1051 Budapest Hungary
+36 1 327 3233 (Phone)
+36 1 327 3232 (Fax)
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