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Private-to-Private Corruption


Antonio Argandoña


University of Navarra - IESE Business School


IESE Business School Working Paper No. 531

Abstract:     
The cases of corruption reported by the media tend almost always to involve a private party (a citizen or a corporation) that pays, or promises to pay, money to a public party (a politician or a public official, for example) in order to obtain an advantage or avoid a disadvantage. Because of the harm it does to economic efficiency and growth, and because of its social, political and ethical consequences, private-to-public corruption has been widely studied. Private-to-private corruption, by contrast, has been relatively neglected and only recently has started to receive the attention it deserves. The purpose of this paper is to offer some thoughts on the nature and importance of private-to-private corruption; the legal treatment it receives in some of the world's leading countries; and the measures that companies can take to combat it, with special consideration of its ethical aspects.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 20

Keywords: Bribery, corporate ethics, extortion, private-to-private corruption

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Date posted: April 13, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Argandoña, Antonio, Private-to-Private Corruption. IESE Business School Working Paper No. 531. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=685864 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.685864

Contact Information

Antonio Argandoña (Contact Author)
University of Navarra - IESE Business School ( email )
Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain
+34 93 2534200 (Phone)
+34 93 2534343 (Fax)
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