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Firm Size and Capital Structure


Alexander Kurshev


London Business School

Ilya A. Strebulaev


Stanford University - Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research

January 2007

AFA 2008 New Orleans Meetings Paper

Abstract:     
Firm size has been empirically found to be strongly positively related to capital structure. This paper investigates whether a dynamic capital structure model can explain the cross-sectional size-leverage relationship. The driving force that we consider is the presence of fixed costs of external financing that lead to infrequent restructuring and create a wedge between small and large firms. We find four firm-size effects on leverage. Small firms choose higher leverage at the moment of refinancing to compensate for less frequent rebalancings. Their longer waiting times between refinancings lead to lower levels of leverage at the end of restructuring periods. Within one refinancing cycle the intertemporal relationship between leverage and firm size is negative. Finally, there is a mass of firms opting for no leverage. The analysis of dynamic economy demonstrates that in cross-section the relationship between leverage and size is positive and thus fixed costs of financing contribute to the explanation of the stylized size-leverage relationship. However, the relationship changes sign when we control for the presence of unlevered firms.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

Keywords: Capital structure, leverage, firm size, transaction costs, default, dynamic programming, dynamic economy, refinancing point

JEL Classification: G12, G32

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Date posted: March 23, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Kurshev, Alexander and Strebulaev, Ilya A., Firm Size and Capital Structure (January 2007). AFA 2008 New Orleans Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=686412 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.686412

Contact Information

Alexander Kurshev
London Business School ( email )
Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
Ilya A. Strebulaev (Contact Author)
Stanford University - Graduate School of Business ( email )
655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
HOME PAGE: http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/strebulaev/

National Bureau of Economic Research ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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