Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=687116
 
 

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Modeling Firms' Choice of Public Issuance


Chris Lamoureux


University of Arizona - Department of Finance

Ali Nejadmalayeri


Oklahoma State University - Department of Finance; Oklahoma State University, Stillwater - Spears School of Business

March 15, 2005

AFA 2006 Boston Meetings Paper

Abstract:     
In this paper, we evaluate external capital issuance from the perspective of an optimizing agent in a static choice framework. Thus, the issue choice affords a glimpse into the decision-making process of public companies. In the context of this decision, we examine the extent to which we are able to quantify the heterogeneity across firms. To this end, we estimate a hierarchical choice model where the utility derived from each alternative depends only on characteristics (e.g., costs) of that alternative. In the model, firm's responses to these characteristics are functions of that firm's attributes. We find that the higher the cost of an alternative, the lower is the indirect utility derived from that alternative (in a manner that is fully consistent with choice theory). Furthermore, this budget constraint effect is significantly influenced by firm attributes. For instance, more profitable firms are less cost-sensitive in their issuance choices.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 38

Keywords: External financing choice

JEL Classification: G32, L20, C11, C35

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Date posted: March 25, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Lamoureux, Chris and Nejadmalayeri, Ali, Modeling Firms' Choice of Public Issuance (March 15, 2005). AFA 2006 Boston Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=687116 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.687116

Contact Information

Chris Lamoureux (Contact Author)
University of Arizona - Department of Finance ( email )
McClelland Hall
P.O. Box 210108
Tucson, AZ 85721-0108
United States
520-621-7488 (Phone)
Ali Nejadmalayeri
Oklahoma State University - Department of Finance ( email )
College of Business Administration
North Hall Room 305
Tulsa, OK 74106
United States
918-594-8399 (Phone)
918-594-8281 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://spears.okstate.edu/profiles/?id=241
Oklahoma State University, Stillwater - Spears School of Business ( email )
201 Business
Stillwater, OK 74078-0555
United States
(918) 594-8399 (Phone)
(918) 594-8281 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://spears.okstate.edu/profiles/?id=241
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