Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=687167
 
 

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The Role of Uninformed Investors in an Optimal IPO Mechanism, or What Google Did Right and Facebook Did Wrong


Alexey Malakhov


University of Arkansas, Fayetteville - Sam M. Walton College of Business, Department of Finance

August 5, 2013


Abstract:     
This paper explores optimal ways for a firm to sell its initial public offering (IPO) to a mix of informed and uninformed investors through an intermediary. The informed investors are assumed to behave as an "exclusive club" by colluding to protect their private information about the IPO value. I argue that uninformed investors' profit provides a benchmark for informed investors, resulting in an endogenous constraint that affects the issuer's revenue. I conclude that higher revenues are achieved with higher numbers of uninformed investors participating in an IPO. Furthermore, the intermediary serves as the only credible provider of information about uninformed investors' realized demand to informed investors. This increases the issuer's expected revenue, and provides a rationale for substantial commissions paid to the intermediary. The above implications could be stylistically interpreted in the context of IPOs by Google and Facebook.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Keywords: IPO, Uninformed Investors, Optimal Mechanism, IPO Intermediation, IPO Underwriter

JEL Classification: G24

working papers series


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Date posted: March 19, 2005 ; Last revised: August 16, 2013

Suggested Citation

Malakhov, Alexey, The Role of Uninformed Investors in an Optimal IPO Mechanism, or What Google Did Right and Facebook Did Wrong (August 5, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=687167 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.687167

Contact Information

Alexey Malakhov (Contact Author)
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville - Sam M. Walton College of Business, Department of Finance ( email )
Fayetteville, AR 72701
United States
479-575-6118 (Phone)
479-575-8407 (Fax)
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