|
||||
|
||||
The Economics of Mutual-Fund Brokerage: Evidence from the Cross Section of Investment ChannelsSusan Kerr ChristoffersenUniversity of Toronto - Rotman School of Management; Copenhagen Business School Richard B. EvansUniversity of Virginia - Darden School of Business David K. MustoUniversity of Pennsylvania - Finance Department December 20, 2005 AFA 2006 Boston Meetings Paper Abstract: Retail investors often lack investment expertise. Mutual-fund brokers can help, but their incentives are mixed so it is an empirical question what value they add, both for consumers and for fund families. Investors pay more to invest through unaffiliated brokers than captive brokers, and while unaffiliated brokers add more value to redemptions, captive brokers add more value to inflows. No-load investors are less likely to sell their poor-performing funds and more likely to sell their winning funds, consistent with a disposition effect. Fund families benefit from a captive salesforce through recapture of redemptions, but also suffer through cannibalization of inflows.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 37 Keywords: Mutual Fund, Financial Intermediary, Brokers working papers seriesDate posted: March 23, 2005 ; Last revised: December 11, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
||||||||||||||||||
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.484 seconds