Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=689562
 
 

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Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm Value


Mihir A. Desai


Harvard Business School - Finance Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Dhammika Dharmapala


University of Chicago Law School



Abstract:     
Do corporate tax avoidance activities advance shareholder interests? This paper tests alternative theories of corporate tax avoidance that yield distinct predictions on the valuation of corporate tax avoidance. Unexplained differences between income reported to capital markets and to tax authorities are used to proxy for tax avoidance activity. These "book-tax" gaps are shown to be larger when firms are alleged to be involved in tax shelters. OLS estimates indicate that the average effect of tax avoidance on firm value is not significantly different from zero, but is positive for well-governed firms as predicted by an agency perspective on corporate tax avoidance. An exogenous change in tax regulations that affected the ability of some firms to avoid taxes is used to construct instruments for tax avoidance activity. The IV estimates yield larger overall effects and reinforce the basic result that higher quality firm governance leads to a larger effect of tax avoidance on firm value. The results are robust to a wide variety of tests for alternative explanations. Taken together, the results suggest that the simple view of corporate tax avoidance as a transfer of resources from the state to shareholders is incomplete given the agency problems characterizing shareholder-manager relations.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: Taxes, tax avoidance, tax shelters,book-tax gaps, governance, firm value

JEL Classification: G32, G34, G12, H25, H26, K34

working papers series





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Date posted: March 20, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Desai, Mihir A. and Dharmapala, Dhammika, Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm Value. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=689562 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.689562

Contact Information

Mihir A. Desai (Contact Author)
Harvard Business School - Finance Unit ( email )
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-6693 (Phone)
617-496-6592 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Dhammika Dharmapala
University of Chicago Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
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