Credibility of Management Forecasts
Jonathan L. Rogers
University of Colorado at Boulder - Leeds School of Business
Phillip C. Stocken
Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth
Accounting Review, Vol. 80, October 2005
We examine how the market's ability to assess the truthfulness of management earnings forecasts affects how managers bias their forecasts, and we evaluate whether the market's response to management forecasts is consistent with it identifying predictable forecast bias. We find managers' willingness to misrepresent their forward-looking information in response to their incentives varies with the market's ability to detect misrepresentation. We examine incentives induced by the litigation environment, insider trading activities, firm financial distress, and industry concentration. With regard to the stock price response to forecasts, we find the market varies its response with the predictable bias in the forecast. The efficiency of the market's response, however, varies with the forecast news.
Keywords: management forecast credibility, voluntary disclosure, management incentives, rational expectations
JEL Classification: G12, G14, G33, D82, M41
Date posted: April 15, 2005
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