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http://ssrn.com/abstract=692764
 
 

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Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration


David T. Zaring


University of Pennsylvania - Legal Studies Department

2004

Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 5, p. 547, 2005
Washington & Lee Legal Studies Paper No. 2005-13
NYU Institute for International Law and Justice Working Paper No. 2004/6

Abstract:     
Informal international regulatory cooperation is changing into recognizable forms of international administration. This paper surveys some of those forms. The forms range from hard procedural law to soft harmonization-through-example. They include: 1) hard international rules that constrain institutions in developed countries; 2) softer principles of supervision which bureaucrats in developing countries may emulate; and 3) models for regulators in adjacent issue areas. It is in attempting to adopt hard rules that we see an escalating procedural formality to regulatory cooperation. We also see a softer proselytization of unobjectionable, easy (for already sophisticated regulators, at least) standards throughout the developing world. Finally, the horde of organizations that have copied the form and agendas of established regulatory cooperation mechanisms also play a part in emerging international administration. The principal case studies for the paper come from international financial regulation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 59

Keywords: International Administration

JEL Classification: K29, K33

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Date posted: April 14, 2005 ; Last revised: July 4, 2013

Suggested Citation

Zaring, David T., Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration (2004). Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 5, p. 547, 2005; Washington & Lee Legal Studies Paper No. 2005-13; NYU Institute for International Law and Justice Working Paper No. 2004/6. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=692764

Contact Information

David T. Zaring (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania - Legal Studies Department ( email )
3730 Walnut Street
Suite 600
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

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