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http://ssrn.com/abstract=693421
 
 

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Does the European Company Prevent the 'Delaware-effect'?


Joseph A. McCahery


Tilburg University - School of Law; European Banking Center (EBC); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Duisenberg School of Finance; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Erik P. M. Vermeulen


Tilburg University - Department of Business Law; Philips International BV; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); Kyushu University - Faculty of Law

March 2005

TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2005-010

Abstract:     
The forces of globalization and economic integration have given a fresh impetus to company law reform in Europe. As recent judgments of the European Court of Justice encourage competitive lawmaking within the European Union, discussions about the role of the European Commission in the development of company law abound. Who is responsible for setting the agenda and controlling the legislative outcome? The further harmonization attempts and the introduction of the European Company Statute questions the necessity of EU intervention in the company laws regulated by the member states.

This article analyzes the history of EU company law and locates a stable 'non-competitive equilibrium'. This equilibrium follows from member states' unwillingness to give up their lawmaking authority regarding company law issues. From the outset, member states were determined to prevent the 'Delaware-effect'. Since then, stability has ruled. The agenda-setting in EU company law has changed little during the existence of the EU. Even though the recent enactment of the European Company has triggered discussion about competitive lawmaking, it appears that competitive incentives hardly play a decisive role in the development of company law.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: Company Law, European Company, Regulatory Competition, Delaware

JEL Classification: H77, K22

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Date posted: April 7, 2005  

Suggested Citation

McCahery, Joseph A. and Vermeulen, Erik P. M., Does the European Company Prevent the 'Delaware-effect'? (March 2005). TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2005-010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=693421 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.693421

Contact Information

Joseph A. McCahery (Contact Author)
Tilburg University - School of Law; European Banking Center (EBC) ( email )
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31-(0)13-466-2306 (Phone)
+31-(0)13-466-2323 (Fax)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Duisenberg School of Finance ( email )
Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands
Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
Erik P.M. Vermeulen
Tilburg University - Department of Business Law ( email )
Philips International BV ( email )
Amstelplein 2
Amsterdam, Noord-Holland 1070 MX
Netherlands
Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
Kyushu University - Faculty of Law ( email )
6-19-1, Hakozaki, Higashiku
Fukuoka, 812-8581
Japan
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