Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=693484
 
 

References (51)



 
 

Citations (9)



 


 



Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate Governance?


Roberta Romano


Yale Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

March 27, 2005

Yale Law & Economics Research Paper 307; Yale ICF Working Paper 05-02; NYU, Law and Economics Research Paper 04-03
ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 26/2005

Abstract:     
This article provides an analysis of why regulatory competition in corporate law has operated, for the most part, successfully in the United States, and critiques the position of commentators who are skeptical of the significance and extent of state competition. The article begins by setting out the context in which regulatory competition has been most recently criticized, the U.S. Congress's response to corporate accounting scandals in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and by briefly noting how the problematic features of that legislative response underscore the benefits of regulatory competition. It then evaluates recent criticisms of regulatory competition that focus on the role of the federal government, or the incentives of states other than the leading incorporation state, Delaware, and conclude that U.S. corporate law is not the product of state competition. The article contends that these permutations on the state competition debate do not provide a satisfactory positive explanation of the behavior or the influence of the states and federal government. The minimum policy implication of the analysis is that it would be imprudent for policymakers to overlook the competitive regulatory experience in U.S. corporate law when assessing the approach to take to company and securities law. Prepared for the Special Issue of the Oxford Review of Economic Policy on Corporate Governance and the Corporate Governance Conference at the Said Business School, University of Oxford, January 28, 2005.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

Keywords: regulatory competition,corporate law,corporate governance,Sarbanes-Oxley Act

JEL Classification: G30, G38, K22

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: March 28, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Romano, Roberta, Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate Governance? (March 27, 2005). ; ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 26/2005. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=693484 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.693484

Contact Information

Roberta Romano (Contact Author)
Yale Law School ( email )
P.O. Box 208215
New Haven, CT 06520-8215
United States
203-432-4965 (Phone)
203-432-4871 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 6,799
Downloads: 1,688
Download Rank: 4,690
References:  51
Citations:  9

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.297 seconds