Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=694441
 
 

References (37)



 
 

Citations (4)



 


 



A Theory of Affirmative Action in College Admissions


Qiang Fu


Indiana University

October 2004



Abstract:     
When candidates from two groups compete for admission to college, we show that a college maximizes the test scores of its incoming class by adopting an admissions rule that favors the weaker group. Such "handicapping" of the weaker group increases competition and induces both groups to invest more in educational attainment. When the weaker group is in the minority, these results reconcile the often assumed conflicts between diversity and academic quality. While both groups invest more, we find that the stronger group responds to affirmative action more aggressively than the weaker group, which tends to widen the intergroup test score gap.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: Affirmative Action, College Admissions, All-Pay Auction, Incentive

JEL Classification: H0, J7

working papers series


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Date posted: April 7, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Fu, Qiang, A Theory of Affirmative Action in College Admissions (October 2004). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=694441 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.694441

Contact Information

Qiang Fu (Contact Author)
Indiana University ( email )
107 S Indiana Ave
100 South Woodlawn
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States
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