Who's Monitoring the Monitor? Do Outside Directors Protect Shareholders' Interests?
Posted: 17 Apr 2005
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Who's Monitoring the Monitor? Do Outside Directors Protect Shareholders' Interests?
Abstract
The corporate governance literature is rich with empirical tests of the relation between board composition and firm performance. We consider the effect of board composition on a different measure of performance, the probability a firm will be sued by shareholders. We find firms that are defendants in securities litigation have higher proportions of insiders and of gray directors and have smaller boards than a matched group of firms that are not sued, even when controlling for firm value and industry. The results suggest that boards with higher proportions of outside directors do a better job of monitoring management.
Keywords: Board of directors, corporate governance, monitoring, shareholder lawsuits
JEL Classification: G34, K22
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