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http://ssrn.com/abstract=695561
 
 

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Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information: Exclusive Versus Optional Remedies


Ronen Avraham


University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

Zhiyong Liu


Indiana State University - Scott College of Business


American Law and Economics Review, July 2006
Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 05-05

Abstract:     
Scholars have been debating for years the comparative advantage of damages and specific performance. Yet, most work has compared a single remedy contract to another single remedy contract. But contract law provides the non-breaching party with a variety of optional remedies to choose from in case of a breach, and parties themselves regularly write contracts which provide such options. In this article, we start filling this gap by studying multi-remedy contracts. Specifically, we compare a contract that grants the non-breaching party an option to choose between liquidated damages and specific performance with an exclusive remedy contract, which restricts the non-breaching party's remedy to liquidated damages only.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 39

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Date posted: April 4, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Avraham, Ronen and Liu, Zhiyong, Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information: Exclusive Versus Optional Remedies. American Law and Economics Review, July 2006; Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 05-05. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=695561 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.695561

Contact Information

Ronen Avraham (Contact Author)
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law ( email )
727 East Dean Keeton Street
Austin, TX 78705
United States
(512) 232-1357 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/profile.php?id=ra22397

Zhiyong Liu
Indiana State University - Scott College of Business ( email )
Scott College of Business
Indiana State University
Terre Haute, IN 47809
United States
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