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Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information: Exclusive Versus Optional RemediesRonen AvrahamUniversity of Texas at Austin - School of Law Zhiyong LiuIndiana State University - Scott College of Business American Law and Economics Review, July 2006 Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 05-05 Abstract: Scholars have been debating for years the comparative advantage of damages and specific performance. Yet, most work has compared a single remedy contract to another single remedy contract. But contract law provides the non-breaching party with a variety of optional remedies to choose from in case of a breach, and parties themselves regularly write contracts which provide such options. In this article, we start filling this gap by studying multi-remedy contracts. Specifically, we compare a contract that grants the non-breaching party an option to choose between liquidated damages and specific performance with an exclusive remedy contract, which restricts the non-breaching party's remedy to liquidated damages only.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 39 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: April 4, 2005Suggested CitationContact Information
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