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Time to Complete and Research Joint Ventures: A Differential Game ApproachJorge NavasUniversity of Barcelona - Department of Actuarial, Financial and Economic Mathematics Peter M. KortTilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research; Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) February 2005 CentER Discussion Paper No. 2005-29 Abstract: In this paper we analyze cooperation in R&D in the form of RJVs.We show that the optimal size of an RJV does not only depend on the degree of spillovers, as literature suggests, but also on the cost function of R&D activities. Moreover, the explicit consideration of the fact that R&D projects take time to complete shows that benefits from cooperation in R&D not only allow RJVs to carry out larger R&D projects, but also to reduce the time to completion for projects with a given size and, consequently, to accelerate the acquisition of the benefits associated with the innovation.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 33 Keywords: Differential games, research joint ventures, time to complete JEL Classification: C73, L13, O31 working papers seriesDate posted: April 5, 2005Suggested CitationContact Information
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