Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=699121
 
 

References (22)



 
 

Citations (5)



 


 



Aggregation of Expert Opinions


Dino Gerardi


Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Richard P. McLean


Rutgers University - Department of Economics

Andrew Postlewaite


University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

April 2005

PIER Working Paper No. 05-016; Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1503

Abstract:     
Conflicts of interest arise between a decision maker and agents who have information pertinent to the problem because of differences in their preferences over outcomes. We show how the decision maker can extract the information by distorting the decisions that will be taken, and show that only slight distortions will be necessary when agents are "informationally small". We further show that as the number of informed agents becomes large the necessary distortion goes to zero. We argue that the particular mechanisms analyzed are substantially less demanding informationally than those typically employed in implementation and virtual implementation. In particular, the equilibria we analyze are "conditionally" dominant strategy in a precise sense. Further, the mechanisms are immune to manipulation by small groups of agents.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

Keywords: Information aggregation, Asymmetric information, Cheap talk, Experts

JEL Classification: C72, D78, D82

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Date posted: April 5, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Gerardi, Dino and McLean, Richard P. and Postlewaite, Andrew, Aggregation of Expert Opinions (April 2005). PIER Working Paper No. 05-016; Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1503. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=699121 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.699121

Contact Information

Dino Gerardi (Contact Author)
Yale University - Cowles Foundation ( email )
Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States
203-432-3562 (Phone)
203-432-5779 (Fax)
Richard P. McLean
Rutgers University - Department of Economics ( email )
75 Hamilton Street
New Jersey Hall
New Brunswick, NJ 08901
United States
732-932-7709 (Phone)
732-932-7416 (Fax)
Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )
3718 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-7350 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~apostlew
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