The Modernization of European Antitrust Enforcement: The Economics of Regulatory Competition
University of California Hastings College of Law; Ugent - CASLE; Stanford CIS
University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna
George Mason Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2005
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 05-09
In this article we analyze the expected effects of regulatory overlap in European competition law resulting from Regulation 1/2003. Drawing upon recently developed economic theories of regulatory competition, our model foresees a number of qualitative adjustments resulting from this reform. On one hand, the direct applicability of the exemption provision should increase the overall amount of exemptions. On the other hand, a decentralized system permits private litigants' forum shopping, and parallel enforcement by multiple national competition authorities will drive up the number of infringement findings. Although the precise direction of substantive competition law is unclear, the overall effect is higher levels of regulatory activity. This entails not only greater administrative costs but also suggests increased transaction costs for doing business in the post-Regulation 1/2003 European Union.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 22
Keywords: Regulatory competition, antitrust, european competition law
JEL Classification: K00, K21, L40
Date posted: April 6, 2005
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