Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=699802
 
 

Citations (1)



 
 

Footnotes (66)



 


 



The Modernization of European Antitrust Enforcement: The Economics of Regulatory Competition


Ben Depoorter


University of California Hastings College of Law; Ugent - CASLE; Stanford CIS

Francesco Parisi


University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna


George Mason Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2005
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 05-09

Abstract:     
In this article we analyze the expected effects of regulatory overlap in European competition law resulting from Regulation 1/2003. Drawing upon recently developed economic theories of regulatory competition, our model foresees a number of qualitative adjustments resulting from this reform. On one hand, the direct applicability of the exemption provision should increase the overall amount of exemptions. On the other hand, a decentralized system permits private litigants' forum shopping, and parallel enforcement by multiple national competition authorities will drive up the number of infringement findings. Although the precise direction of substantive competition law is unclear, the overall effect is higher levels of regulatory activity. This entails not only greater administrative costs but also suggests increased transaction costs for doing business in the post-Regulation 1/2003 European Union.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 22

Keywords: Regulatory competition, antitrust, european competition law

JEL Classification: K00, K21, L40


Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: April 6, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Depoorter, Ben and Parisi, Francesco, The Modernization of European Antitrust Enforcement: The Economics of Regulatory Competition. George Mason Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2005; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 05-09. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=699802 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.699802

Contact Information

Ben Depoorter (Contact Author)
University of California Hastings College of Law ( email )
200 McAllister Street
San Francisco, CA 94102
United States

Ugent - CASLE ( email )
Universiteitstraat 4
Belgium
Stanford CIS ( email )
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

Francesco Parisi
University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )
229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

University of Bologna ( email )
Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 3,176
Downloads: 599
Download Rank: 32,073
Citations:  1
Footnotes:  66

© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.219 seconds