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Law and the Boundaries of Technology-Intensive Firms


Oren Bar-Gill


New York University School of Law

Gideon Parchomovsky


University of Pennsylvania Law School; Bar Ilan University - Faculty of Law


University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 157, Pg. 1649, 2009
NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 04-06
U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper 05-10

Abstract:     
Arrow's disclosure paradox implies that information that is not afforded legal protection cannot be bought or sold on the market. This paper emphasizes the important relationship between the paradox of disclosure and the boundaries of the firm question. Only legally protected inventions, i.e., patented inventions, may be traded; pre-patent stages of the innovation process may not. Consequently, by force of law, rather than by the guidance of economic principle, pre-patent innovation must be carried out within the boundaries of a single firm.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

Keywords: Boundaries of the firm, disclosure paradox, intellectual property law

JEL Classification: D23, K11, L22

working papers series


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Date posted: April 11, 2005 ; Last revised: August 21, 2009

Suggested Citation

Bar-Gill, Oren and Parchomovsky, Gideon, Law and the Boundaries of Technology-Intensive Firms. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 157, Pg. 1649, 2009; NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 04-06; U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper 05-10. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=702464 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.702464

Contact Information

Oren Bar-Gill (Contact Author)
New York University School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-998-6222 (Phone)
212-995-4590 (Fax)
Gideon Parchomovsky
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-1603 (Phone)
Bar Ilan University - Faculty of Law ( email )
Ramat Gan 52900
Israel
972-2-5317078 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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