Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=702641
 
 

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The Analysis of Tying Cases: A Primer


Jean Tirole


University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI); University of Toulouse 1 - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Quantitative (GREMAQ); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)


Competition Policy International, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 1-25, Spring 2005

Abstract:     
This primer analyzes factors that make ties more likely either to hurt or to benefit consumers. It first identifies factors that influence where the impact of tying on competition in the tied market stands, ranging from little impact on the rivals' ability to compete to total exclusion of competitors. Then, after reviewing anticompetitive and efficiency-enhancing motives for tying, it argues that tying should be submitted to a rule of reason standard. Furthermore, tying should not be a distinct offense but considered as one possible mechanism of predation. Like many other corporate strategies that make one's products attractive to consumers, tying has the potential of hurting competitors, and, therefore, is just one in a large range of strategies that can be employed to prey on them. Finally, the primer discusses the costs and benefits of adopting a predation-based standard.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Keywords: Tying, Exclusion, Predation

JEL Classification: D4

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: April 21, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Tirole, Jean, The Analysis of Tying Cases: A Primer. Competition Policy International, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 1-25, Spring 2005. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=702641

Contact Information

Jean Tirole (Contact Author)
University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI) ( email )
Place Anatole France
21 Allees de Brienne
F-31042 Toulouse Cedex
France
+33 5 61 12 8642 (Phone)
+33 5 61 12 8637 (Fax)
University of Toulouse 1 - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Quantitative (GREMAQ) ( email )
Manufacture des Tabacs
21 Allees de Brienne
Toulouse, 31000
France
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
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