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More Social Security, Not Less

William N. Goetzmann

Yale School of Management - International Center for Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

April 12, 2005

Yale ICF Working Paper No. 05-05

This paper explores the feasibility of a government-sponsored insurance company, patterned after the government-sponsored mortgage agencies, that would be authorized to sell government-insured wage-indexed retirement annuities. This enterprise would assume the current obligations and cash flows of the social security system in exchange for the exclusive right to sell additional insurance contracts. It may or may not choose to finance itself through the issuance of equity shares. The empirical analysis in the paper focuses on the stochastic nature of the liabilities faced by such an agency and in particular examines the optimal portfolio of assets required to hedge wage-indexed liabilities.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 22

Keywords: Social Security, Wage Inedexation

JEL Classification: G22, H55

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Date posted: April 12, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Goetzmann, William N., More Social Security, Not Less (April 12, 2005). Yale ICF Working Paper No. 05-05. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=703141

Contact Information

William N. Goetzmann (Contact Author)
Yale School of Management - International Center for Finance ( email )
165 Whitney Ave.
P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States
203-432-5950 (Phone)
203-436-9252 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://viking.som.yale.edu

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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