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More Social Security, Not LessWilliam N. GoetzmannYale School of Management - International Center for Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) April 12, 2005 Yale ICF Working Paper No. 05-05 Abstract: This paper explores the feasibility of a government-sponsored insurance company, patterned after the government-sponsored mortgage agencies, that would be authorized to sell government-insured wage-indexed retirement annuities. This enterprise would assume the current obligations and cash flows of the social security system in exchange for the exclusive right to sell additional insurance contracts. It may or may not choose to finance itself through the issuance of equity shares. The empirical analysis in the paper focuses on the stochastic nature of the liabilities faced by such an agency and in particular examines the optimal portfolio of assets required to hedge wage-indexed liabilities.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 22 Keywords: Social Security, Wage Inedexation JEL Classification: G22, H55 working papers seriesDate posted: April 12, 2005Suggested CitationContact Information
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