Protection for Sale with Imperfect Rent Capturing

36 Pages Posted: 25 May 2006 Last revised: 17 Oct 2022

See all articles by Giovanni Facchini

Giovanni Facchini

Tinbergen Institute

Johannes Van Biesebroeck

K.U.Leuven; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Gerald Willmann

Bielefeld University; IfW Kiel; KU Leuven; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Date Written: April 2005

Abstract

Structurally estimating the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model using coverage ratios that include non-tariff barriers leads to biased parameter estimates. We develop a "protection for sale" theoretical framework consistent with the data, by explicitly allowing for non-tariff barriers. Introducing partial rent capturing we obtain a testable specification which finds support in the data. Our results suggest that average rent capturing is in the order of 72-75 percent.

Suggested Citation

Facchini, Giovanni and Van Biesebroeck, Johannes and Willmann, Gerald, Protection for Sale with Imperfect Rent Capturing (April 2005). NBER Working Paper No. w11269, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=705589

Giovanni Facchini

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://paople.few.eur.nl/facchini

Johannes Van Biesebroeck (Contact Author)

K.U.Leuven ( email )

Naamsestraat 69
B-3000 Leuven
Belgium
+3216326793 (Phone)
+3216326796 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/public/N07057/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Gerald Willmann

Bielefeld University ( email )

Universitätsstraße 25
Bielefeld, NRW 33613
Germany

IfW Kiel ( email )

P.O. Box 4309
Kiel, Schleswig-Hosltein D-24100
Germany

KU Leuven ( email )

Oude Markt 13
Leuven, Vlaams-Brabant 3000
Belgium

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany