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Superstar CEOs


Ulrike Malmendier


University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Geoffrey A. Tate


University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Kenan-Flagler Business School

February 2, 2005

7th Annual Texas Finance Festival Paper

Abstract:     
We analyze the impact of winning high-profile tournaments on the subsequent behavior of the tournament winner in the context of chief executive officers of U.S. corporations. We find that the firms of CEOs who achieve "superstar" status via prestigious nationwide awards from the business press subsequently underperform, both relative to the overall market and relative to a sample of "hypothetical award winners" with matching firm and CEO characteristics. At the same time, award-winning CEOs extract significantly more compensation from their company following the award, both in absolute amounts and relative to other top executives in their firm. They also spend significantly more time and effort on public and private activities outside their company such as assuming board seats or writing books. The incidence of earnings management increases significantly after winning awards. Our results suggest that media-induced superstar culture leads to behavioral distortions beyond mere mean reversion. We also find that the effects are strongest in firms with weak corporate governance, suggesting that firms could prevent the negative consequences.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 56

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Date posted: April 24, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Malmendier, Ulrike and Tate, Geoffrey A., Superstar CEOs (February 2, 2005). 7th Annual Texas Finance Festival Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=709861 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.709861

Contact Information

Ulrike Malmendier (Contact Author)
University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics ( email )
549 Evans Hall #3880
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
United States
(510) 642-8724 (Phone)
(510) 642-6615 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/~ulrike/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.iza.org/en/webcontent/personnel/photos/index_html?key=918
Geoffrey A. Tate
University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Kenan-Flagler Business School ( email )
McColl Building
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3490
United States

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References:  16
Citations:  64

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