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Superstar CEOs

Ulrike Malmendier
University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Geoffrey Alan Tate
University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School


February 2, 2005

7th Annual Texas Finance Festival Paper

Abstract:     
We analyze the impact of winning high-profile tournaments on the subsequent behavior of the tournament winner in the context of chief executive officers of U.S. corporations. We find that the firms of CEOs who achieve "superstar" status via prestigious nationwide awards from the business press subsequently underperform, both relative to the overall market and relative to a sample of "hypothetical award winners" with matching firm and CEO characteristics. At the same time, award-winning CEOs extract significantly more compensation from their company following the award, both in absolute amounts and relative to other top executives in their firm. They also spend significantly more time and effort on public and private activities outside their company such as assuming board seats or writing books. The incidence of earnings management increases significantly after winning awards. Our results suggest that media-induced superstar culture leads to behavioral distortions beyond mere mean reversion. We also find that the effects are strongest in firms with weak corporate governance, suggesting that firms could prevent the negative consequences.

Working Paper Series

Date posted: April 24, 2005 ; Last revised: April 24, 2005

Contact Information

Ulrike Malmendier (Contact Author)
University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics ( email )
549 Evans Hall #3880
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
United States
(510) 642-8724 (Phone)
(510) 642-6615 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/~ulrike/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )
90-98 Goswell Road
London EC1V 7RR United Kingdom
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) ( email )
P.O. Box 7240
D-53072 Bonn Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.iza.org/en/webcontent/personnel/photos/index_html?key=918
Geoffrey Alan Tate
University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )
3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States
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