Abstract

 
 

References (60)



 
 

Citations (29)



 


 



The Microeconomic Evidence on Capital Controls: No Free Lunch


Kristin J. Forbes


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

February 2005

MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4532-05

Abstract:     
Macroeconomic analyses of capital controls face a number of imposing challenges and have yielded mixed results to date. This paper takes a different approach and surveys an emerging literature that evaluates various microeconomic effects of capital controls and capital account liberalization. Several key themes emerge. First, capital controls tend to reduce the supply of capital, raise the cost of financing, and increase financial constraints - especially for smaller firms, firms without access to international capital markets and firms without access to preferential lending. Second, capital controls can reduce market discipline in financial markets and the government, leading to a more inefficient allocation of capital and resources. Third, capital controls significantly distort decision-making by firms and individuals, as they attempt to minimize the costs of the controls or even evade them outright. Fourth, the effects of capital controls can vary across different types of firms and countries, reflecting different pre-existing economic distortions. Finally, capital controls can be difficult and costly to enforce, even in countries with sound institutions and low levels of corruption. This microeconomic evidence on capital controls suggests that they have pervasive effects and often generate unexpected costs. Capital controls are no free lunch.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 39

Keywords: capital controls, capital account liberalization, capital mobility

JEL Classification: F2, F3, G1

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: April 25, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Forbes, Kristin J., The Microeconomic Evidence on Capital Controls: No Free Lunch (February 2005). MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4532-05. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=710523 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.710523

Contact Information

Kristin J. Forbes (Contact Author)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
Room E52-455
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-8996 (Phone)
617-258-6855 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://web.mit.edu/kjforbes/www
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 3,071
Downloads: 301
Download Rank: 39,717
References:  60
Citations:  29

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.453 seconds