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http://ssrn.com/abstract=711862
 
 

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Multiproduct Discounting: A Myth of Nonprice Predation


Daniel A. Crane


University of Michigan Law School


University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 72, p. 27, 2005

Abstract:     
This essay in the University of Chicago Law Review's Antitrust Symposium challenges the view adopted in the Third Circuit's en banc decision in LePage's v. 3M with respect to multiproduct discounting. It argues that mixed bundling is a pervasive, and generally pro-consumer, form of price competition that should be disapproved only where it effectively amounts to predatory pricing.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Keywords: antitrust, predatory pricing

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Date posted: April 27, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Crane, Daniel A., Multiproduct Discounting: A Myth of Nonprice Predation. University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 72, p. 27, 2005. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=711862

Contact Information

Daniel A. Crane (Contact Author)
University of Michigan Law School ( email )
625 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215
United States
734-615-2622 (Phone)
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