Games Commissions Play: 2x2 Games of International Securities Regulation
Amir N. Licht
Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah - Radzyner School of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
John M. Olin Discussion Paper No. 223
The internationalization of securities markets causes the effects of domestic securities regulations systems to be externalized to foreign markets. Securities regulation regimes of interlinked markets thus become relevant to one another. By implementing 2x2 game models and insights from international regime theory, the Paper identifies factors influencing regulatory competition and cooperation in three major subjects: disclosure, securities fraud, and insider trading. The likely outcomes of such competition and cooperation vary greatly with the subject matter of regulation, thus refuting any sweeping treatment of "securities regulation" as a monolith. Disclosure tends to be governed by dynamics akin to a "race for the bottom", therefore requiring strong international institutions to curb the trend. Securities fraud is more likely to be regulated in relative harmony, thus calling for weaker international arrangements, while insider trading regulation mainly calls for assurance mechanisms.
JEL Classification: K22, G15, G18, G38working papers series
Date posted: March 27, 1998
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