Sentencing Antitrust Offenders: Reconciling Economic Theory with Legal Theory
Kenneth Glenn Dau-Schmidt
Indiana University Maurer School of Law
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 75, 1984
This Article evaluates two different economic models of criminal law as applied to the enforcement of antitrust laws. The author argues that economic models which propose antitrust punishment be limited to fines and then to fines that are levied against only business entities, are deficient because they account for only the general deterrent effect of punishment and include a value of criminal benefit for the offender, a value not shared by society. He presents, as an alternative, a model that accounts for benefits afforded by incarceration such as the signaling of what is a criminal offense, changes in the criminal's taste for crime, and venting society's desire for retribution. He concludes that incarceration of individual antitrust offenders serves a valuable societal function.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 27
Keywords: Antitrust, Sentencing, Crime, Law and Economics
JEL Classification: K14, K21, L41, L51Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: April 28, 2005
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