Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=712167
 


 



Sentencing Antitrust Offenders: Reconciling Economic Theory with Legal Theory


Kenneth Glenn Dau-Schmidt


Indiana University Maurer School of Law


William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 75, 1984

Abstract:     
This Article evaluates two different economic models of criminal law as applied to the enforcement of antitrust laws. The author argues that economic models which propose antitrust punishment be limited to fines and then to fines that are levied against only business entities, are deficient because they account for only the general deterrent effect of punishment and include a value of criminal benefit for the offender, a value not shared by society. He presents, as an alternative, a model that accounts for benefits afforded by incarceration such as the signaling of what is a criminal offense, changes in the criminal's taste for crime, and venting society's desire for retribution. He concludes that incarceration of individual antitrust offenders serves a valuable societal function.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: Antitrust, Sentencing, Crime, Law and Economics

JEL Classification: K14, K21, L41, L51

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Date posted: April 28, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Dau-Schmidt, Kenneth Glenn, Sentencing Antitrust Offenders: Reconciling Economic Theory with Legal Theory. William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 75, 1984. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=712167

Contact Information

Kenneth Glenn Dau-Schmidt (Contact Author)
Indiana University Maurer School of Law ( email )
211 S. Indiana Avenue
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States
812-855-0697 (Phone)
812-855-0555 (Fax)
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