CEO Influence and Executive Compensation

Sridharan, Uma V.

Abstract

Citations

CEO Influence and Executive Compensation

Uma V. Sridharan

Lander University

FINANCIAL REVIEW, February, 1996

Abstract:
The sales-maximization hypothesis and the shareholder wealth-maximization hypothesis have been suggested in prior finance literature to explain the determinants of CEO pay. This paper proposes that CEO influence over the board is an additional explanation for the size of CEO pay. Evidence from the 1989-1991 period indicates that CEO pay is positively related to measures of CEO influence over the board. Results of this study suggest that CEO salary levels are mostly a function of CEO influence over the board, the growth in sales and the size of the firm.

JEL Classification: J33

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: July 3, 1998

Suggested Citation

Sridharan, Uma V., CEO Influence and Executive Compensation. FINANCIAL REVIEW, February, 1996. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=7209

Contact Information

Uma V. Sridharan (Contact Author)

Lander University ( email )

Greenwood, SC 29649
United States